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The more precedents there are, the less occasion is there for law;
that is to say, the less occasion is there for investigating principles.
1
— Dr. Samuel Johnson
I. INTRODUCTION

Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides that “[e]vidence
of another crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove the
† Associate, Faegre & Benson, LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota, and former
Assistant Minnesota State Public Defender. Thanks to Susan Andrews, Brad
Colbert, Michael Cromett, and Cathryn Middlebrook for helpful suggestions, and
especially to Scott Swanson and Marie Wolf for helpful suggestions and for
inspiration generally. The usual disclaimers, including that the opinions
expressed and mistakes made are all my own, apply.
1. JAMES BOSWELL, LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 615 (1906).
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character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
2
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” Despite
the apparent simplicity of the rule’s prescriptions, the law of other
3
bad acts evidence in Minnesota is confusing and inconsistent.
Cases within this body of law are difficult to square with one
another and often the doctrine articulated within a given opinion is
itself subject to internal tension.
In these respects, the Minnesota law of bad acts evidence is not
4
unlike many other large bodies of law. Whenever a court must
repeatedly apply the same rules, some aspects of its case law will
almost inevitably reflect inconsistent results and doctrine. To some
extent this may be a product of intent, as judges craft opinions
based on an understanding of the law not shared by all of their
colleagues. It is perhaps more often a result of the practical
difficulty of obtaining a comprehensive grasp of a large body of law,
such that no new case is likely to be decided by a court having all—
rather than a select few—of its cases in mind.
Whatever its causes, the phenomenon ought to be troubling.
The notion that like cases are to be treated alike is fundamental to
our justice system. Inconsistent results mean that like cases have
not been treated alike and inconsistent doctrine means that
inconsistent results can nevertheless be consistent with the stated
law. The concern is even greater with respect to the criminal
justice system. It is particularly important in that context, as the
Supreme Court has observed, that “justice must satisfy the
5
appearance of justice.”
Where judicial opinions do not
consistently state the law and cannot consistently apply the law,
however, that goal is compromised.
The nature of bad acts evidence is such that the law governing
2. MINN. R. EVID. 404(b).
3. Subsequent references in this article are to “bad acts evidence,” simply
because “other bad acts evidence”—which I prefer to “other crimes evidence”
because Minn. R. Evid. 404(b) is not limited to other crimes—is somewhat
unwieldy. I avoid the commonly-used “Spreigl evidence” because using the name of
an old opinion would be incongruous with my arguments.
4. See Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial
Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1394 (1995) (noting, in the administrative law
context, the “tendency for the ‘winning’ and ‘losing’ description of the same
standard to become increasingly polarized over time, confusing and frustrating
agencies and litigants as to what is the ‘real standard.’”).
5. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954).
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its use may be especially susceptible to the development of
inconsistencies. Evidence that a defendant has committed another,
usually similar, crime is obviously relevant to the question of
whether he committed the crime for which he is on trial. Just as
obvious is the tremendous potential for that evidence to unfairly
prejudice a defendant. By the time the issue is put before an
appellate court, however, the evidence will have been admitted and
the defendant convicted. It is, as a result, easy to appreciate the
psychological pull toward affirmance present in nearly every one of
these cases. For this very reason, it is critical that the law governing
the admissibility of bad acts evidence be both certain and
susceptible to relatively easy and justifiable application. Such
clarity not only makes for easier administration of the law by the
trial courts, but, by effectively precommitting the appellate court,
also helps to ensure that this psychological pull does not lead to
results contrary to what more abstract consideration would
generate. Stated more simply, it provides greater assurance that
like cases will, in fact, be treated alike.
This article argues that because the law relating to bad acts
evidence in Minnesota suffers from these problems, it needs to be
thoroughly reconsidered and recast. The article proceeds as
follows. Part II traces the treatment of bad acts evidence by the
Minnesota Supreme Court during the twentieth century. That
history reveals that the law was unsettled, often dramatically so, for
the entirety of the century and that a number of internal tensions
and inconsistencies remain. Part III considers the functions of
written opinions in our judicial system as well as the doctrine of
precedent, which is central to those functions. Part IV considers
the law of bad acts evidence in light of the material explored in
Part III. It concludes that this body of law has reached the point
where no written opinion can meaningfully fulfill the functions for
which the device was designed This article further concludes that
the only remedy is for the Minnesota Supreme Court to undertake
a top-to-bottom reconsideration of the law, and in the process, to
6
expressly discard all of its pre-existing case law on the subject.

6. I do not consider or take any position regarding what the results of such a
reconsideration ought to be.
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II. A CENTURY OF BAD ACTS EVIDENCE IN
THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT
A. The First Four Decades
The century in Minnesota bad acts evidence law opened with a
pair of bribery cases against members of the Minneapolis police
7
force. The first was State v. Fitchette, in which the defendant, a
captain on the force, was charged with accepting two hundred
dollars to secure the reappointment of a former policeman. The
trial court allowed not only testimony and evidence relating to the
incident for which Fitchette was on trial, but also testimony
regarding an incident six months earlier in which he accepted
money to obtain an appointment for another applicant. Fitchette
was convicted and he appealed. The supreme court opened its
analysis by noting that the evidence introduced as to the incident
for which Fitchette was tried “if credited, was sufficient to establish
every substantive element of the crime for which defendant was
8
prosecuted.” Yet it concluded that Fitchette was so prejudiced by
the introduction of the testimony regarding the prior incident that
he was deprived of a fair trial and reversed the conviction.
In so doing, the court articulated a strong formulation of the
general rule against the admission of bad acts evidence. Because a
defendant is to be presumed innocent, and because he is entitled
to be informed of the precise act with which he is charged so that
he can prepare for trial,
the proof of independent offenses of the same nature and
character as the one for which the accused is tried cannot
be given in evidence as a makeweight against him. In the
conduct of a trial in a court of law against a person
charged with crime the suspicions of the detective or
interested prosecutor, derived from a minute examination
of the previous career of the accused, are not to be
7. 88 Minn. 145, 92 N.W. 527 (1902). The court decided another bribery
case involving a Minneapolis police officer on the same day which also presented a
question relating to the admissibility of bad acts evidence. State v. Gardiner [sic],
88 Minn. 130, 92 N.W. 529 (1902) (the case title in the Minnesota Reporter is
State v. Gardner). The court reversed that conviction as well and, referring to
Fitchette, stated, “[i]t is an elementary rule that on the trial of a party for a crime
evidence that he or others committed another unrelated crime is not relevant.”
Id. at 144, 92 N.W. at 535.
8. Fitchette, 88 Minn. at 147, 92 N.W. at 528.
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regarded as the legitimate subject of inquiry by the
tribunal which is to determine the issue of his guilt or
innocence. These principles are elementary. They are
recognized and declared with unvarying unanimity by
every reputable text-writer who has referred to the
9
subject.
To further bolster the point, the court quoted three contemporary
10
treatises on evidence in support of this statement of the rule.
While emphasizing the strength of the general prohibition, the
court was careful to note the existence of “well-defined” exceptions,
such as to “show a distinct hostility, jealousy, or erotic passion;” to
establish intent in cases where the defendant claims the charged
act was a mistake; to establish identity where the two acts are “so
connected or involved” as to relate to one another; and where the
prior act is “part of a scheme or conspiracy incidental to or
11
involved with the one on trial.” But, the court emphasized, these
exceptions to the general prohibition are just that. As a result, if
the proposed evidence’s fit within one of these narrow exceptions
“is not clear in any particular instance, and the trial judge does not
clearly perceive that the evidence falls within its purview, the
accused is to be given the benefit of the doubt, and the evidence
12
rejected.”
The state had alleged that the evidence of the prior incident
ought to have been admitted against Fitchette because it suggested
that he was engaged in a system of accepting bribes. The court
dismissed this argument, suggesting that it would expand the
exception to swallow the rule. “It is said that this charge is very
similar to others which might be a part of an iniquitous scheme.
This might be, for this is but little originality in the commission of
crime. One bribery, robbery, or larceny is very much like any
13
other.” Thus, in the court’s view, the evidence presented against
Fitchette went to the very heart of the prohibition and the
conviction was reversed.
Seven months later, the court—whose personnel had not
changed—issued an opinion with a much different feel. State v.
9. Id. at 147, 92 N.W. at 528.
10. Id. at 147-48, 92 N.W. at 528 (citing the Jones, Wharton & Underhill
treatises).
11. Id. at 148, 92 N.W. at 528.
12. Id. at 148-49, 92 N.W. at 528 (citations omitted) (Minnesota Reporter
states “is doubtful in any particular instance . . .”).
13. Id. at 150, 92 N.W. at 529.
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14

Ames was also a bribery case. Ames was the superintendent of the
Minneapolis police department, charged with receiving a fifteen
15
In the state’s
dollar protection payment from a local madam.
view, this incident was merely part of a larger undertaking, as the
court put it, “to put the abandoned women of Minneapolis under
16
tribute to him in return for his official protection . . . .” The case
put on against Ames reflected this view. Witnesses testified that
Ames visited the brothels of Minneapolis with two of his officers
and told the proprietors that they could expect to soon begin
making payments to him, that one of these officers paid a
subsequent visit accompanied by a local jeweler, and that this pair
instructed the madams to make payments to the jeweler. The
evidence challenged under the doctrine of Fitchette related to
payments made to the jeweler by other madams. Ames claimed
that these were separate crimes and inadmissible pursuant to the
general prohibition of bad acts evidence. The court disagreed,
concluding that the evidence of these acts was inextricably bound
up in the overall scheme, and thus within one of the approved
17
exceptions.
For purposes of this article the Ames opinion is striking not for
its result, which is arguably consistent with the doctrine articulated
in Fitchette, but rather for the court’s statement of the rule and its
distancing of itself from the still-fresh opinion in Fitchette. With
nearly as much authoritative window-dressing as adorned the
confident statement of the law in Fitchette, the court articulated a
vision of a very different regime. Instead of a broad prohibition
subject to narrowly-drawn and jealously-guarded exceptions,
“reduced to its narrowest compass, the true rule is that evidence of
the commission of other crimes is admissible when it tends
corroboratively or directly to establish the defendant’s guilt of the
crime charged in the indictment on trial, or some essential
18
ingredient of such offense.” This requirement is met when the
evidence “discloses a motive, a criminal intent, guilty knowledge,
the absence of mistake, identifies the defendant, or is a part of a
common scheme or plan embracing two or more crimes so related

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

90 Minn. 183, 96 N.W. 330 (1903).
Id. at 188, 96 N.W. at 331.
Id. at 193, 96 N.W. at 333.
Id. at 193, 96 N.W. at 333.
Id. at 192, 96 N.W. at 333 (emphasis added).
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to each other that the proof of one tends to establish the other.”
As for the court’s quite different statement of the law just seven
months prior: “[w]hat was said in the general discussion of the
subject in the Fitchette case was not with a view of laying down any
20
hard and fast rule in such cases.”
For the next dozen years, the court ignored Fitchette and cited
Ames as having articulated the general rule. In State v. Peterson the
court stated the rule as being “that evidence of the commission of
other crimes by the defendant is competent if it tends,
corroboratively or directly, to establish his guilt of the crime
charged in the indictment on trial, or some essential ingredient
21
thereof . . . .”
Again in State v. Briggs, the court found that
evidence of other crimes was admissible to establish a plan “to
commit the crimes for the purpose of plunder and gain” under
“the rule by which evidence of other crimes is admissible in
22
corroboration of the specific charge laid in the indictment.”
Not until 1916 did the court find it appropriate to cite Fitchette
again, taking the position that the “general rule” was that
articulated in Fitchette, namely “that it cannot be shown that the
23
accused has committed other crimes.” For a while, it appeared as
though this might merely have been an aberration. For at least
three more years, the court’s opinions continued to reflect the view
that Ames established the general rule.
In December of 1918, the court extended the logic of Ames

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. State v. Peterson, 98 Minn. 210, 211, 108 N.W. 6, 7 (1906).
22. State v. Briggs, 122 Minn. 493, 500, 142 N.W. 823, 826 (1913). Two
months prior to Briggs, the court reversed a conviction in part on the trial court’s
failure to allow broad evidence of the defendant’s good character. Citing Ames,
the court noted that “[e]vidence of good character goes to the probabilities of
defendant’s guilt, and bears on the general question of guilty or not guilty.” State
v. Hutchison, 121 Minn. 405, 408, 141 N.W. 483, 484 (1913).
23. State v. Newell, 134 Minn. 384, 386-87, 159 N.W. 829, 830 (1916). The
defendant was charged with manslaughter based on her alleged performance of
an abortion. Id. at 385, 159 N.W. at 829. She apparently denied it, though the
opinion does not describe whether she denied performing any procedure or
instead denied that the procedure she performed was an abortion. The court
nonetheless upheld admission of evidence of defendant’s consent to perform an
abortion for another person as relevant to establishing intent. Id. at 386, 159
N.W. at 830. That exception to the general rule, however, typically applies only
where a defendant does not dispute the act, but instead argues that it was
committed by accident or mistake. See 1 JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 190 (5th ed. 1999).
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nearly as far as it would go in State v. Hartung. The defendant in
that case lived in the small town of Welcome and was sitting outside
a store in that town when Red Cross volunteers happened by
soliciting contributions to fund the organization’s assistance of the
American war effort. Hartung suggested that they were working for
the wrong side and that he would not contribute unless the money
went to Germany. For this he was charged with and convicted of
violating a statute prohibiting speech advocating that citizens
“should not aid or assist the United States in prosecuting or
25
carrying on war with the public enemies of the United States.”
On cross-examination he was asked about a similar incident which
occurred four months later, to which his counsel objected. The
trial court overruled the objection and the supreme court affirmed.
Justice Hallam reasoned for the court that “[t]he evidence tended
to show a continued state of mind and habit of speech. It showed
inclination to commit an offense of the character charged, and had
some tendency to corroborate the evidence of the state’s witnesses
26
and to show the guilt of the defendant of the crime charged.”
Justice Hallam authorized a similar opinion nine months later
27
The defendant in that case was a doctor
in State v. Whipple.
charged with the sale of morphine to an addict and the state was
allowed to introduce evidence of his sales to other addicts. Though
the court might easily have justified introduction of the evidence
28
under the intent exception to the Fitchette rule, it instead cited
Ames and Hartung for the proposition that such evidence “is
admissible if it is part of one plan or scheme carried on by
defendant to willfully violate the law or if it tends to show an
29
inclination or predisposition to commit the offense charged.”
24. 141 Minn. 207, 169 N.W. 712 (1918).
25. 1917 Minn. Laws Ch. 463 § 3.
26. Hartung, 141 Minn. at 211, 169 N.W. at 714.
27. 143 Minn. 403, 173 N.W. 801 (1919).
28. The defendant’s position was that he sold the drug as part of a course of
treatment for the addiction via “the gradual reduction method.” In contrast to
Newell, evidence that he sold morphine to other addicts was likely relevant to
establishing that his intent in making the sale at issue was impure.
29. Whipple, 143 Minn. at 407, 173 N.W. at 802 (citation omitted). Justice
Hallam was not finished. In State v. Clark, 155 Minn. 117, 192 N.W. 737 (1923), he
wrote the opinion for the court in a case arising out of a conviction for the sale of
liquor in which it affirmed the admission of evidence of other sales by the
defendant. Notably, Justice Hallam did not rely on the Ames formulation of the
rule, but rather affirmed the conviction on the theory that the sales demonstrated
“a general system or plan to commit crimes similar to the one charged.” Id. at 118,
192 N.W. at 737. In other words, they fit within one of the exceptions to the
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The Ames formulation of the rule last appeared in the garb of a
30
general standard in December, 1920. In In re Nash, the court
stated the rule in the following manner: “[p]roof of other offenses
of the same nature as the offenses charged, and which tend to show
that the defendant was pursuing a general scheme or course of
conduct which embraced the commission of such offenses, is
admissible for the purposes of corroboration even in criminal
31
trials.”
Fitchette’s resurgence was taking root even as these last few
opinions relied on the Ames rule. In May of 1919, the court in State
v. Monroe, though affirming the conviction, cited Fitchette in
acknowledging the “well-established” rule against the admission of
32
evidence of other crimes. Ames, in contrast, was relegated to a
string cite supporting the equally well-established exception to the
general rule for admission of other crimes “which appear to be
33
members of a disclosed system.” Subsequent cases endorsed this
34
formulation.

Fitchette rule. Even so, Justice Dibell dissented in a powerfully written opinion. He
observed that the evidence presented established no more of a common scheme
or plan than would any evidence that the defendant had in the past committed
similar acts. Id. at 120, 192 N.W. at 738. Relying on arguments similar to those
advanced in this article, he argued that if the court disagreed with the general
rule, it ought to change the rule rather than simply stating without analysis that
the evidence fit within one of the exceptions. Id. at 120-22, 192 N.W. at 738-39.
30. In re Nash, 147 Minn. 383, 181 N.W. 570 (1920). The court latched onto
the Ames formulation again in State v. Upson, 162 Minn. 9, 201 N.W. 913 (1925),
but not for purposes of admitting evidence of crimes by the defendant. The
defendant in that case, a farmer living with his parents, was convicted of selling a
pint of moonshine. The dispute on appeal concerned evidence of two sales made
by his mother. The court observed that “[e]vidence is neither within nor without
the ‘rule of exclusion’ simply because it shows other offenses. The relevancy of
such evidence is to be determined as is that of any other. Id. at 15, 201 N.W. at
915 (citing Ames). This seems correct, though the opinion did generate a dissent
by Justice Wilson (though not from Justice Dibell, who dissented in Clark), see
supra note 29.
31. In re Nash, 147 Minn. at 390, 181 N.W. at 573.
32. State v. Monroe, 142 Minn. 394, 398, 172 N.W. 313, 315 (1919).
33. Id.
34. See State v. Friedman, 146 Minn. 373, 378, 178 N.W. 895, 897 (1920). The
court endorsed the Monroe discussion, though it appeared to equate Monroe and
Whipple. See id. See also State v. Nelson, 148 Minn. 285, 300, 181 N.W. 850, 856
(1921) (citing Fitchette in support of the general rule that “[e]vidence of
independent crimes is generally incompetent,” though one subject to exceptions,
as stated in Monroe, “which go quite far.”). Cf. State v. Pugliese, 149 Minn. 126, 182
N.W. 958 (1921) (citing Monroe and Fitchette as standing for the proposition that
admission of a separate and independent crime is sound).
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The court finally turned the corner in State v. Friend. In that
case the defendant was charged with statutory rape and the victim
testified that the defendant told her about a number of other
underage girls with whom he had also had sex. The court cited
Fitchette in support of the proposition that “[e]vidence of other
crimes is not in general admissible in proof of the crime charged,”
noted that this case did not fall within any of the exceptions to the
rule, and further quoted Fitchette in asserting that the testimony
regarding the asserted prior acts amounted to “makeweight”
36
against the defendant. The court was not finished. Perhaps not
confident that mere reliance on its own caselaw would serve to
convince that reversal was appropriate, the court canvassed a
variety of authorities from which it extracted the purpose for the
rule. “That evidence of other crimes has probative force is without
question. It affects the judgment of the average juror, and of the
trained legal mind of the lawyer and of the judge accustomed to
37
scrutinize and weigh evidence.”
For that reason, the court
concluded, the evidence in a criminal trial should generally relate
38
only to the specific act with which the defendant is charged. Here
the evidence relating to other acts was of neither the quality nor
type to overcome this presumption and a new trial was required.
From that point on, the court never again cited Ames in
support of a general rule, but rather in support of the proposition
39
that the general rule of Fitchette is subject to exceptions. Through
at least the 1930s Fitchette was the leading case on the subject of bad
40
This did not, however, prevent the court from
acts evidence.
reaching results inconsistent with Fitchette’s rationale. In State v.
35. 151 Minn. 138, 186 N.W. 241 (1922).
36. Id. at 139-40, 186 N.W. at 241 (Minnesota Reporter quotes as “makeweight”).
37. Id. at 140, 186 N.W. at 242.
38. Id. (quoting Paulson v. State, 118 Wis. 89, 94 N.W. 771 (1903)).
39. See State v. Drews, 274 Minn. 426, 431, 144 N.W.2d 251, 255 (1966); State
v. Wofford, 262 Minn. 112, 118, 114 N.W.2d 267, 271 (1962); State v. Glazer, 176
Minn. 442, 444, 223 N.W. 769, 769-770 (1929); State v. Sabatini, 171 Minn. 137,
139, 213 N.W. 552, 553 (1927); State v. Eames, 163 Minn. 249, 251-52, 203 N.W.
769, 770 (1925). See also City of St. Paul v. Greene, 238 Minn. 202, 206, 56 N.W.2d
423, 426 (1952) (citing Ames in support of the proposition that the court there had
come “near to following the rule” pursuant to which relevance is the only
consideration); State v. Clark, 155 Minn. 117, 192 N.W. 737 (1923) (citing Ames in
support of the proposition that evidence of the crimes of others may be relevant).
40. See State v. Yurkiewicz, 212 Minn. 208, 210-11, 3 N.W.2d 775, 776 (1942);
State v. Stuart, 203 Minn. 301, 306, 281 N.W. 299, 302 (1938); State v. Sweeney,
180 Minn. 450, 455-56, 231 N.W. 225, 227-28 (1930).
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Voss, for example, the court articulated the governing standard in
the appropriate manner, but nonetheless concluded that it was not
error for the district court to have admitted evidence of the stealing
41
of barley in a case concerning the theft of hogs.
This article is concerned primarily with the court’s statement
of the applicable rule (rather than whether the rule—whatever it
is—is an appropriate way of dealing with other bad acts evidence).
Viewed from that perspective, the first four decades of the
twentieth century break down into two distinct and nearly separate
periods. Though in Fitchette the court opened the century with
possibly the strongest statement of the rule disfavoring bad acts
evidence it has ever made, it quickly, and with no change in
personnel, came back with nearly its strongest statement of the rule
in the other direction in Ames.
Following Ames, the court simply ignored Fitchette for over a
decade. The general rule favored admission and, under it, the
court sanctioned results that could not have been justified
consistent with any faithful adherence to Fitchette. Some of the
explanation undoubtedly rests in matters not addressed in the
opinions, namely the social pressures accompanying World War I
and Prohibition. Even so, it is curious that the court did not bother
to confront Fitchette in any of these opinions. Instead, the court
confidently proceeded as if the Ames rule had long been settled and
needed no reconsideration.
Fitchette’s reemergence occurred in a similar fashion. The
court did not acknowledge, let alone explain, its lengthy absence.
Nor did the court’s opinions pause to consider that by bringing
Fitchette to the fore it was implementing a significant jurisprudential
change of course. The court went from legal relevance to logical
relevance and back, the entire time purporting to do nothing more
than follow precedent. In this way, the close appearance of Fitchette
and Ames foreshadowed what was to follow throughout the rest of
the century.
B. The Law at Mid-Century
Little had changed by 1953, when bad acts evidence was the

41. 192 Minn. 127, 255 N.W. 843 (1934). The court offered no analysis, but
rather a bare conclusion that the evidence was appropriate in connection with
establishing the defendant’s intent. Id. at 129, 255 N.W. at 844.
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subject of a Note published in the Minnesota Law Review.
Consistent with the history outlined above, the author suggested
that the court had to that point in the century been inconsistent in
43
both its statement and its application of the law. Worse yet, the
court had simply invented new exceptions where it could not
44
plausibly fit the evidence within an existing exception.
In the
context of sex crimes, the court appeared to have abandoned the
45
rule entirely, a result the author deemed “somewhat illogical.”
“Since natural prejudice against the sex offender is so great, it
would seem that he should be afforded more, rather than less,
46
protection.” In sum, the Note describes a system in which, though
the author appears by and large not to find the results of the cases
he surveyed exceptionable, the law was unsettled and such strict
adherence to it as might have been possible in the circumstances
was forsworn where it would lead to undesirable results.
The occasion of the Note appears to have been the court’s
47
decision in City of St. Paul v. Greene. The two defendants in that
case were convicted of selling liquor to minors. On appeal, they
challenged the district court’s allowance of evidence that they had
on other occasions sold liquor to the same minors. The supreme
court affirmed the conviction via an opinion heavier on bark than
bite. Justice Knutson quoted liberally from a number of the court’s
past opinions on the subject of bad acts evidence, discussed recent
scholarly criticism of the general rule excluding such evidence, and
noted that the court in Ames “came near to following” the
48
inclusionary version of the rule. Having built up this doctrinal
conflict, however, he did nothing to resolve it. Where the reader
expects a bold proclamation in favor of one standard or the other,
Justice Knutson instead noted with respect to the evidence before it
49
that “it is clear that it is admissible under our decisions.”
42. Note, Evidence of Defendant’s Other Crimes: Admissibility in Minnesota, 37
MINN. L. REV. 608 (1953).
43. Id. at 611-13 (noting the court’s failure to consistently place admitted
evidence within one of the articulated exceptions to the general prohibition) and
615-16 (noting the court’s failure, on a broader level, to articulate the general rule
in terms of exclusion or relevance).
44. Id. at 615.
45. Id. at 614.
46. Id.
47. 238 Minn. 202, 56 N.W.2d 423 (1952).
48. Id. at 203-06, 56 N.W.2d at 425-26.
49. Id. at 207, 56 N.W.2d at 426. Interestingly, three years earlier Justice
Knutson wrote an opinion for the court in which he stated, without any of the
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Three years later, however, the court in State v. DePauw
expressly declared its allegiance to “[t]he general and wellestablished rule in criminal cases . . . that evidence which in any
manner shows or tends to show that the accused has committed
another crime independent of that for which he is on trial is
50
inadmissible. . . .” The court adhered to this position more or less
51
consistently for the next decade.
C. The Spreigl Era
Possibly the century’s most important opinion dealing with
bad acts evidence, at least if status as a shorthand reference to an
52
entire body of law is any indication, came in State v. Spreigl.
Theodore Spreigl was convicted of “taking indecent liberties” with
his stepdaughter, based in part on her testimony regarding prior
instances during the preceding year, coupled with similar testimony
from another stepdaughter and a stepson. On appeal, Spreigl
argued that the trial court ought to have excluded this evidence, or
at least instructed the jury that it was not to consider the evidence
53
as bearing on his guilt or innocence of the charged act.
Justice Otis’ opinion for the court is impressive. Its analytical
sweep is broad, taking into account both the court’s historical
treatment of the issue and scholarly commentary on how it ought
54
to be dealt with.
More importantly, the opinion evidences a
consistent awareness of the rationale for the rule and a struggle to
square that rationale with both the facts of the case at hand and the
larger context in which evidence of other bad acts is utilized.
Still, the opinion is not faultless. It presents as the “basic issue”
for resolution as
hesitation apparent in Greene, that “[i]t is a general rule that evidence of separate
and independent crimes is inadmissible to prove the guilt of a person charged
with having committed a crime.” State v. Bock, 229 Minn. 449, 454, 39 N.W.2d
887, 890 (1949).
50. 246 Minn. 91, 93, 74 N.W.2d 297, 299 (1955).
51. See, e.g., State v. Wofford, 262 Minn. 112, 117, 114 N.W.2d 267, 271 (1962)
(“It is well established that evidence that the accused has committed another
crime unrelated and unconnected with the one for which he is on trial is
inadmissible since it is not competent to prove one crime by proving another.”);
State v. Connelly, 249 Minn. 429, 440, 82 N.W.2d 489, 496 (1957) (“It is the
general rule that evidence of other separate and independent crimes is
inadmissible in the trial of a defendant charged with a criminal offense.”).
52. 272 Minn. 488, 139 N.W.2d 167 (1965).
53. Id. at 489-90, 139 N.W.2d at 168-69.
54. Id. at 490-96, 139 N.W.2d at 169-72.
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whether the unquestioned relevance of testimony that a
defendant has committed other sex offenses, if true, gives
it sufficient probative value to outweigh the patent
unfairness which results to an innocent defendant who is
confronted with charges against which he is not prepared
to defend, which are inflammatory in the extreme, and
which emanate from witnesses who are manifestly
55
susceptible to influence and suggestion.
Ultimately, however, the court failed to resolve a number of
these issues. While it noted, for example, both its apparent past
adoption of a presumption that bad acts evidence is more
appropriate in sex cases because of an implicit assumption that sex
56
offenders are more prone to recidivism and the existence of
57
studies questioning that assumption, it ultimately took no position
58
on whether a different standard applies in sex cases. In similar
fashion, the opinion dwells on the fact that the witnesses offering
the testimony were especially susceptible to suggestion and
improper influence; nevertheless, the opinion does not resolve how
59
such situations ought to be addressed.
The court did, however, take two important steps toward
clarifying the law applicable to bad acts evidence. First, citing to
Fitchette, it reiterated the rule that the defendant is to be given the
benefit of the doubt whenever proposed evidence does not clearly
fall within one of the exceptions to the general rule against
60
admissibility. This is not an obvious clarification because such a
presumption was arguably the law all along. Still, it is a rule of
potentially great significance if applied consistently and one almost

55. Id. at 490, 139 N.W.2d at 169.
56. Id. at 493, 139 N.W.2d at 170.
57. Id. at 493 n.10, 139 N.W.2d at 120 n.10.
58. See id. at 488, 139 N.W.2d 167.
59. Id. at 494, 139 N.W.2d at 171. In a continuation of this discussion, the
court did note that the fact that
two of the children who claim to have been victims of repeated and
shocking misconduct over an extended period of time made no
complaint to their mother nor to anyone else until after the offense for
which defendant is here charged, and the third child made no complaint
at any time. This is something we cannot ignore in weighing the
question of whether defendant should have a new trial.
Id. Though perhaps related in this case, the questions of susceptibility to
suggestion and whether a sustained failure to object reflects on credibility are
distinct issues.
60. Id. at 495, 139 N.W.2d at 172 (citing State v. Fitchette, 88 Minn. 145, 149,
92 N.W. 527, 528 (1902)).
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never mentioned—and therefore, presumably, rarely applied—in
the cases between Fitchette and Spreigl. Second, the court adopted a
61
Specifically, the court articulated a rule
notice requirement.
pursuant to which evidence of other bad acts “shall not hereafter
be received unless within a reasonable time before trial the state
furnishes defendant in writing a statement of the offenses it intends
to show he has committed, described with the particularity
62
required of any indictment or information. . . .”
63
Two years later, in State v. Billstrom, the court, again speaking
through Justice Otis, expanded on the rules articulated in Spreigl.
Although the parties’ arguments were devoted largely to whether
the proffered bad acts evidence fell within the common scheme or
plan exception, the court determined that the truly applicable
exception was that allowing for the introduction of bad acts
evidence to establish identity. In so doing, the court set forth six
procedures to be followed in cases involving bad acts evidence:
(1)Notice must be given as required by Spreigl;
(2)The prosecutor must identify, at the time the evidence
is offered, the exception under which it is being offered;
(3)Even where the evidence is offered to establish
identity, “there must nevertheless be some relationship in
time, location, or modus operandi between the crime
charged and the other offenses;”
(4)In cases where the evidence is offered to establish
identity, it is only admissible where the other evidence
relating to the perpetrator’s identity is “otherwise weak or
inadequate;”
(5)The defendant’s participation in the incidents offered
must be established by clear and convincing evidence; and
(6)“Both at the time the evidence is received and in the
final charge, the court should admonish the jury that the
testimony is received for the limited purpose of
64
establishing identity.”
61. Id. at 497, 139 N.W.2d at 173.
62. Id. at 497, 139 N.W.2d at 173. The court adopted three exceptions to the
notice requirement: “(a) offenses which are part of the immediate episode for
which the defendant is being tried; (b) offenses for which defendant has
previously been prosecuted; and (c) offenses which are introduced to rebut
defendant’s evidence of good character.” Id.
63. 276 Minn. 174, 149 N.W.2d 281 (1967).
64. Id. at 178-79, 149 N.W.2d at 284-85. As an opinion, Billstrom does not
quite measure up to Spreigl, primarily because it is not at all clear to what extent
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Despite the fact that Spreigl and Billstrom were plainly intended
to be opinions that redefined the court’s approach to bad acts
evidence, the court at first only sporadically regarded them as such.
Just nine months after Spreigl purported to breathe new life into the
notion that defendants are to be given the benefit of the doubt
when the admissibility of bad acts evidence is questionable, the
65
court in State v. Sorg affirmed the admission of evidence which it
acknowledged it did not feel “was very strong or convincing so as to
link defendant” with the charged crime, and did so without making
66
67
any reference to this presumption. In State v. Saucedo, the court
68
chose to rely on State v. Sweeney for its statement of the general
rule and cited Spreigl only in support of the rule it ignored in Sorg.
Perhaps significantly, each of these opinions had different
69
authors.
In 1977, the rule gained a more authoritative statement in the
form of Rule 404(b) of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence, which
provides:
Evidence of another crime, wrong, or act is not admissible
to prove the character of a person in order to show action
in conformity therewith. It may however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence
70
of mistake or accident.
This rule, while based on and substantively nearly identical to its
71
counterpart in the Federal Rules of Evidence, was not regarded by
its drafters as having effected any change to the then-applicable
72
doctrine in Minnesota. Indeed, the rule was amended after its
initial adoption to bring it more completely in line with the
the court meant for some of its rules to apply outside the context of the identity
exception.
65. 275 Minn. 1, 144 N.W.2d 783 (1966).
66. Id. at 9, 144 N.W.2d at 788.
67. 294 Minn. 289, 200 N.W.2d 37 (1972).
68. 180 Minn. 450, 231 N.W. 225 (1930).
69. Saucedo, 294 Minn. 289, 200 N.W.2d 37 (1972)(MacLaughlin, J., opinion);
Billstrom, 276 Minn. 174, 149 N.W.2d 281 (1967)(Otis, J., opinion); Sorg, 275 Minn.
1, 144 N.W.2d 783 (1966) (Gallagher, J., opinion); Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 139
N.W.2d 167 (1965)(Otis, J., opinion). As noted below, the system by which
opinion authorship is assigned in the Minnesota Supreme Court may contribute to
doctrinal tension by placing too much responsibility for any given case with a
single justice. See infra note 156.
70. MINN. R. EVID. 404(b).
71. See MINN. R. EVID. Preliminary Cmt. (2001); FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
72. See MINN. R. EVID. Preliminary Cmt.
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73

requirements of the case law.
While the adoption of Rule 404(b) put to rest the larger
question of whether there ought to be any special restriction on the
admissibility of bad acts evidence, it did not remove all or even
much of the room for disagreement. Many of the specific
procedures adopted in Spreigl and Billstrom were not incorporated
into the rule. Moreover, one need only take an expansive view of
the exceptions enumerated in the rule, which do not even
comprise an exhaustive list, to end up with something very much
like the Ames rule. As the next section discusses, simply by shifting
the terms of the debate from the now-settled broader question to
the particulars of the rule’s implementation, the court has come
near to doing just that.
D. The End of the Century
In the last two decades, the court has rarely departed from
stating the general rule as one of presumptive exclusion. It would
be difficult for it to do so, given that Spreigl’s name has become
synonymous with bad acts evidence, and the presumption of
exclusion has been incorporated into Rule 404. Indeed, some of
the court’s most recent cases have even stated that the benefit of
the doubt is to be given to the defendant where it is not clear that
74
the proffered evidence fits within one of the exceptions; although,
as discussed below, it is difficult to imagine what effect this has
given the tremendous discretion that the cases grant to the trial
courts.
This is not to suggest that doctrinal consistency reigns
supreme. While the stated general presumption has remained
75
largely consistent, the rules by which it is implemented have not.
The exceptions have received similar treatment. Again, there are
greatly differing formulations of the standards, the most permissive
of which are, in effect, so broad as to swallow the rule. Thus,
although the terms in which it is conducted have changed slightly,
the unacknowledged debate regarding whether evidence of other
bad acts is to be presumptively inadmissible continues.
Because the doctrinal tension has migrated to the lower-order
73. See MINN. R. EVID. 404 Committee Cmt. (1989).
74. E.g., State v. Lynch, 590 N.W.2d 75, 80 (Minn. 1999); State v. Kennedy,
585 N.W.2d 385, 389 (Minn. 1998).
75. Cf. State v. Eling, 355 N.W.2d 286, 292 (Minn. 1984) (discussed at text
accompanying notes 80-86, infra).
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questions, and because the number of cases considering bad acts
76
evidence has increased dramatically, the article shifts focus here
from an examination of the courts statement and application of the
general rule to consideration of the case law within a single
exception, namely evidence of other bad acts relevant to establish
the perpetrator’s identity.
Under the traditional view the identity exception is rarely a
77
distinct ground for admission.
The classic instance in which
another crime would be admissible to establish identity would be a
so-called “signature” crime, in which common details between the
prior crime and the one for which the defendant is on trial are so
distinctive as to make it likely that the two were committed by the
78
same person. Most often, however, relevance as to identity will be
incidental to evidence admissible under some other exception,
such as that for evidence establishing a common scheme or plan.
Moreover, according to one respected evidence treatise, “courts
tend to apply stricter standards when the desired inference pertains
79
to identity as opposed to state of mind.”
At least since Billstrom, however, the Minnesota Supreme Court
has applied a looser standard to the admissibility of bad acts
evidence to show identity than under the other exceptions.
Despite that general trend, however, as the following cases
demonstrate, there is presently some confusion in the case law.
The confusion relates to whether the standard pursuant to which
bad acts evidence offered to show identity is to be assessed is also
the same standard to be used to assess the relevance of bad acts
evidence generally. Moreover, at least some cases suggest that the
court has at times viewed this standard as encompassing the
entirety of the substantive inquiry relating to admissibility. If this is
the case, Ames may have returned via the back door.
1. State v. Eling
80

In State v. Eling, the defendant was convicted of first-degree
76. As of May 18, 2001, Spreigl had been cited in 253 Minnesota appellate
court opinions.
77. See 1 JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 190, at 668
(1999).
78. See id.; 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 404.22[5][c] (Joseph M. McLaughlin, ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed.
2001).
79. See STRONG ET AL., supra note 77, at § 190.
80. 355 N.W.2d 286 (Minn. 1984).
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murder of a security guard during the course of an attempted
robbery of a hospital pharmacy. Two informants connected Eling
to the crime, as did an individual who had helped to plan the crime
but backed out before its commission. One of the informants and
the coconspirator told police that Eling had been shot in the leg,
which was consistent with blood stains the police had found in the
getaway van. Though the opinion does not expressly say as much,
one infers that Eling was in fact found to have been shot in the leg.
Eling did not testify. Instead he relied on the testimony of
friends and family who stated that he had been with them at the
time of the robbery. He also claimed that he had injured his leg
the day before. Reasoning that this testimony placed defendant’s
identity in issue, the trial court allowed the prosecution to present
evidence relating to two armed robberies of pharmacies committed
by Eling eight and ten years before. The three robberies were
similar in that they involved pharmacies, the defendant was armed,
pharmacy personnel were ordered to lie on the floor, and a specific
request was made for “Class A” drugs. The supreme court affirmed.
Speaking through Justice Wahl, the court framed its analysis
with a statement of the rule reminiscent of Ames: “Faced with the
question of whether prior-crime evidence is admissible, the trial
court must determine whether the relevance of the evidence is
81
sufficient to outweigh its potential for prejudice.”
Further,
“[g]enerally, the prosecution must demonstrate a tangible
similarity between the prior crime and the charged offense in terms
82
of time, location, or modus operandi.”
Although—based on
Billstrom—this latter statement presumably only relates to bad acts
evidence proposed to be admitted to establish identity, the opinion
does not call out that limitation, such that it can be read as
standing for the proposition that bad acts evidence must be more
relevant than prejudicial; that relevance is to be judged by
reference to time, location, or modus operandi; and that nearly all
the responsibility for making this assessment rests in the trial
83
court.
Despite the opinion’s somewhat variant statement of the law,
one can make a colorable, if not entirely convincing, argument that
these convictions were admissible even under the traditional
statement of the rule. That is, in both the two prior robberies of
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 291 (citing State v. Filippi, 335 N.W.2d 739, 743-44 (Minn. 1983)).
Id. at 292 (citing Filippi, 335 N.W.2d at 743).
See id. at 291-92.
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which defendant was convicted and the one at issue, the robbers
requested “Class A” drugs. As the court pointed out, a reference to
84
“Class A” drugs was, by 1982, anachronistic, such that it may have
had some value as a “signature” aspect of the crime. Rather than
focusing on this, however, the court appeared to place at least as
much reliance on the fact that Eling’s counsel had warned him that
85
evidence of these prior convictions would probably be admitted
and that, in any event, he had actual notice of the state’s intention
86
to introduce the evidence. Moreover, the court undertook no
analysis of the strength of the remainder of the state’s evidence
relating to identity and made no reference to any of the other
applicable safeguards.
In sum, the opinion evinces a very
permissive approach to the admissibility of bad acts evidence.
2. State v. DeWald
87

In State v. DeWald, the court, again speaking through Justice
Wahl, outlined a very different sort of analysis. The defendant was
charged with the murder of an elderly South Minneapolis woman,
a crime the police had difficulty solving. Three weeks after the
murder, however, an elderly man was murdered in South
Minneapolis and DeWald was connected to that murder. The
police then determined that he had been to the murdered
woman’s house twice roughly a year prior to her death, that a
fingerprint taken from a faucet in the woman’s house matched his,
and that he owned a knife of the same brand as the one with which
she was stabbed. Arguing that this evidence only weakly tied
DeWald to the murder, the state requested that it be allowed to
offer evidence of the man’s murder, which the trial court granted.
Where Eling did not bother with lengthy summaries of law or
an analysis tied to precedent at each step, DeWald adopted a more
formalist air. Justice Wahl opened the discussion by gravely noting
that the court recognized that bad acts evidence can lead both
judge and jury astray. She recited the general rule against
84. Id. at 292.
85. Id. at 290, 291.
86. Id. at 292. Given that prior notice had long since been required by Spreigl
and Billstrom, it is difficult to see how this is relevant to the analysis of any
argument that such evidence should not have been admitted, since if there had
been no prior notice, the analysis would presumably not need to progress to this
stage. See State v. Billstrom, 276 Minn. 174, 178, 149 N.W.2d 281, 284 (1967); State
v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 497, 139 N.W.2d 167, 173 (1965).
87. 464 N.W.2d 500 (Minn. 1991).
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admission of the evidence and articulated, at least in broad form,
the analysis required under Spreigl, including the notion that the
benefit of the doubt is to be given to the defendant in close cases.
The trial court had admitted the evidence of the man’s
murder based on a finding that “it established identity, motive, and
88
modus operandi,” and the supreme court found that there was
“no doubt” that the evidence “had probative value on the issues of
89
Though it
identity and common scheme or plan. . . .”
acknowledged that there were dissimilarities between the two
offenses, the court cited authority for the proposition that absolute
90
similarity is not a prerequisite.
In considering what the court
deemed the more difficult question of whether the other crime’s
unquestioned probative value was outweighed by the potential for
prejudice, the court likewise sought refuge in citations to authority.
Thus, it resolved the issue not through a consideration of the
troubling dynamics of this analysis, but rather through a series of
syllogisms leading it to the conclusion that the trial court did not
91
abuse its discretion in allowing the evidence.
3. State v. Cogshell
92

In State v. Cogshell, the defendant was convicted of selling
crack cocaine to an undercover officer. Because the sale occurred
during the course of an ongoing investigation, the officer did not
make an arrest at the time of the sale. Instead, Cogshell was
arrested over two months later on the basis of a tip from a
confidential informant, followed by the undercover officer’s
88. Id. at 503.
89. Id. It is difficult to characterize the evidence as relevant to motive or
common scheme or plan/modus operandi as those exceptions are traditionally
formulated. Other bad acts are relevant to establish motive only where the
motivation for the crime in question was directly related to the other crimes
sought to be proved, as for example would be the case with a crime committed in
an attempt to cover up earlier crimes. Common scheme or plan requires a similar
integral relationship, as where a car is stolen to use as a getaway vehicle for a
robbery. See 1 JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 190 (5th ed.
1999).
90. DeWald, 464 N.W.2d at 503 (citing State v. Filippi, 335 N.W.2d 739, 743
(Minn. 1983) & State v. Walker, 310 N.W.2d 89, 91 (Minn. 1981)). The mere fact
that absolute similarity is not required does not, of course, answer the question of
why these particular similarities are sufficient, though the court appeared to
consider that to be self-evident.
91. DeWald, 464 N.W.2d at 505. Justice Wahl’s opinion for the court in State v.
Landin, 472 N.W.2d 854 (Minn. 1991), has a very similar feel to it.
92. 538 N.W.2d 120 (Minn. 1995).
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identification of Cogshell in a photo lineup. The trial court
allowed the state to present evidence of a prior sale of crack by the
defendant, which occurred fifteen months before the sale at issue,
and both the court of appeals and the supreme court affirmed.
Justice Tomljanovich began her analysis of the issue by
characterizing the principles relating to bad acts evidence as
consisting of “verbal formulation[s] . . . honed over time” in a body
93
of “well-settled” case law. Here, the prior conviction was offered
to establish identity, for which, the court noted, a “signature”
aspect is not required, but rather “generally there must be some
relation between the other crimes and the charged offense in terms
of time, place, or modus operandi. This means . . . that the mere
fact that the prior crime was of the same generic type as the
charged offense (e.g., robbery and robbery) usually isn’t
94
sufficient.” Here, the court discerned more than just an identity
of generic types. “[B]oth offenses occurred in the same general
area of St. Paul . . . both involved the sale or attempted sale of crack
cocaine, and . . . the crack cocaine was packaged in the same way in
95
both cases.” Conceding that the issue was close, and that other
judges might have ruled the other way, the court nonetheless
concluded that its admission was appropriate. This prompted a
dissent from Justice Gardebring, who, joined by Justice Page,
reasoned that admission of the prior conviction in this case would
justify the admission of prior drug activity in the trial of any drug96
related crime.
4. State v. Shannon
97

The defendant in State v. Shannon was convicted of firstdegree murder in connection with the shooting of a
developmentally-disabled man who was walking near his home in
South Minneapolis. The trial court allowed the state to introduce
evidence regarding a shooting that occurred a few blocks away and
five months before, in which the victim was shot in the course of
being robbed of his marijuana. The circumstances surrounding
the shootings suggested that both were gang-related. The state
argued that evidence of the first shooting was admissible to
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 123.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 124.
Id. at 124-25 (Gardebring, J., dissenting).
583 N.W.2d 579 (Minn. 1998).
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establish identity or common scheme or plan. The supreme court
disagreed and reversed.
Justice Gardebring’s opinion for the court purported to
canvass the relevant authority, including a detailed list of the
Billstrom procedural rules applicable to bad acts evidence.
Operating under a legal framework largely consistent with the
Spreigl/Billstrom approach, the court concluded that the evidence
should not have been admitted because the prosecution had not
established Shannon’s participation in the prior incident by clear
and convincing evidence. Moreover, the court found, there was
not enough commonality between the two events, which were
similar only in that they “occurred in roughly the same
neighborhood within some five months of each other, that both
98
were shootings, and that they involved handguns.” Finally, the
court concluded that the error was not harmless and that a new
trial was required. Justice Gilbert, joined by Justice Page, dissented,
asserting that the evidence was properly admitted because it
established “the common scheme or plan of gang dominance and
enforcement in this particular neighborhood of South
99
Minneapolis.”
5. Can They Be Reconciled?
It is difficult to extract a consistent approach from these cases.
Eling’s discussion of the law is brief and indicative of a permissive
approach, while DeWald and Shannon are more ponderous and
acknowledge the presumption against admissibility, Cogshell treads a
middle ground in what it characterizes as a well-settled body of law.
Thus, despite Rule 404(b)—which generally receives less focused
attention than one would expect of a governing rule—there
remains at least some level of instability in the general standard
itself.
The uncertainties and inconsistencies are more apparent when
viewed at the next level of doctrine. No clear test for determining
whether evidence relates to identity emerges from these cases. In
an opinion issued seven months after DeWald, Justice Wahl cited it
for the proposition that bad acts evidence offered to establish
identity “must be similar to the charged offense either in time,

98.
99.

Id. at 585.
Id. at 586 (Gilbert, J., dissenting).
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100

location, or modus operandi.” Though DeWald used that phrase,
it did so not in the context of articulating the contours of the
identity exception to the general rule, but rather to state the
standard used to determine whether bad acts evidence, once within
101
an exception to the rule of exclusion, is relevant. Ultimately the
102
formulation can be traced to Billstrom.
As introduced there,
however, it appears not to have been intended as the general test
for determining whether evidence falls within the identity
exception, but rather to establish the point that though such
evidence, when introduced to establish identity, need not meet all
the requirements necessary for admission under the common
scheme or plan exception, it must still possess some of those
attributes. In other words, these are attributes that identity-related
evidence must possess to be admissible, rather than being the
definition of such evidence. Billstrom, then, appears to contemplate
retention of the two-step process pursuant to which a court must
first determine which, if any, exception the proffered evidence falls
under and then determine whether the evidence is admissible.
These later cases, however, appear to reduce that inquiry to just the
second step.
The use of the “time, location, or modus operandi” language
103
as the general test for relevance can be traced to State v. Filippi,
where it was used not in the context of the court intentionally
creating a rule, but rather as a doubly-qualified distillation of its
past cases. “In determining relevancy, we have generally required
that the other crime be similar in some way—either in time,
location, or modus operandi—to the charged offense, although this,
104
of course, is not an absolute necessity.”
Cases such as Cogshell,
however, suggest an analysis in which this relevance test is the
featured inquiry with respect to the admission of any bad acts
105
evidence.
Taken at face value, these opinions suggest a regime
100. State v. Landin, 472 N.W.2d 854, 859 (Minn. 1991) (citing State v.
DeWald, 464 N.W.2d 500, 503 (Minn. 1991)).
101. DeWald, 464 N.W.2d at 503.
102. 276 Minn. 174, 178, 149 N.W.2d 281, 284 (1967).
103. 335 N.W.2d 739 (Minn. 1983).
104. Id. at 743 (emphasis added).
105. Even Justice Gardebring’s dissent in Cogshell views the Filippi relevance test
as the only test applicable to the admissibility of bad acts evidence to establish
identity. State v. Cogshell, 538 N.W.2d 120, 125 (Minn. 1995) (Gardebring, J.,
dissenting). Another such opinion is State v. Bolte, 530 N.W.2d 191 (Minn. 1995),
in which the court purported to restate the state of the art in bad acts evidence
law: “Because of the potential for substantial prejudice to the defendant’s case
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in which a court is to ask only whether the evidence is relevant—
judged by similarity in time, location, or modus operandi—and, if it is
relevant, to assess whether it is unduly prejudicial. This skips any
consideration of which exception to the general rule applies and,
as such, results in a rule that, at its core, amounts to the Ames rule,
slightly embellished by the procedural trappings of Spreigl and
Billstrom. It certainly would result in the evisceration of the
common scheme or plan exception, since Billstrom clearly
contemplated that a showing of similarity in time, location, or
modus operandi is less than what is required to establish a common
106
scheme or plan.
Potentially taking things even a step further, in State v.
107
Frisinger, the court stated the reason for the similarity rule as
being “that the closer the relationship, the greater is the relevance
or probative value of the evidence and the lesser is the likelihood
108
that the evidence will be used for an improper purpose.”
This
formulation appears even to omit the need for any separate
prejudice analysis and comes dangerously close to saying that the
entirety of the other bad acts analysis boils down to an assessment
of whether the other act is close in time, location or modus
operandi.
E. A Long Look Back
The century in bad acts evidence law in Minnesota began with
a pair of cases setting forth nearly diametrically opposed views of
the generally-applicable rule. Fitchette contains perhaps the most
restrictive (in terms of admissibility) statement of the rule the court
has ever articulated, while Ames—issued less than a year later by the
very same court—contains perhaps the most permissive. This
beginning foreshadowed all that was to follow in the century. Both
versions of the rule enjoyed periods of predominance, though for
most of the century the stated standard was some version of the
Fitchette rule. At no point, however, did either version of the rule

from the improper admission of other-crime evidence, we take this opportunity to
review the circumstances where other-crime evidence may be admitted.” Bolte, 530
N.W.2d at 196. The court’s otherwise thorough and detailed summary glosses
over the categorization portion of the two-step inquiry, devoting most of its
attention to the relevance requirement.
106. 276 Minn. at 178, 149 N.W.2d at 284.
107. 484 N.W.2d 27 (Minn. 1992).
108. Id. at 31.
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completely vanish.
Given the adoption of Rule 404(b), it would be difficult to
argue that Ames is still good law. Nonetheless, one can trace an
unbroken line of precedent all the way back to either Ames or
Fitchette. The court has never expressly disavowed any of its
significant decisions relating to bad acts evidence, preferring for
the most part simply not to acknowledge contrary authority in its
opinions.
Even now, when 404(b) seemingly mandates a
moderated version of Fitchette, the court via cases such as Cogshell
and Frisinger has at least occasionally articulated a rule that in
operation is very near to the approach of Ames.
To the lawyer or judge looking to analyze the potential
admissibility of bad acts evidence, there are two consequences of
this history. First, because the court has never disavowed any
portion of its case law, and because it has from time to time
reached back to its older cases to extract language and principles,
there are artifacts of that older law that appear along side, yet are
inconsistent with, doctrines of more recent vintage. The most
obvious of these is the notion that, in cases of questionable
admissibility, the defendant is to be given the benefit of the doubt
and the evidence excluded. The concept first appeared in Fitchette,
was emphasized in Spreigl, and has appeared in opinions of the
109
court as recently as 1999. Yet, it is often placed near a statement
emphasizing the trial judge’s considerable discretion in
determining whether bad acts evidence is admissible and
emphasizing that the defendant “bears the burden of showing the
110
error.” It is difficult to imagine how the benefit of the doubt can
operate consistent with such a grant of discretion and it is apparent
111
from the cases that its effect, if any, must be narrow. Indeed, it is
difficult to believe that Fitchette, in which the presumption was first
articulated, would be resolved the same way under the current
abuse of discretion standard. This is just one example of the
contradictory threads in the doctrine, which have multiplied as the
court has implemented the Billstrom rules, such that the law has
become increasingly complex in addition to unsettled.
The second consequence is that there is precedent for virtually
109. See State v. Lynch, 590 N.W.2d 75, 80 (Minn. 1999).
110. See id.; State v. Kennedy, 585 N.W.2d 385, 389 (Minn. 1998).
111. See State v. Cogshell, 538 N.W.2d 120, 124 (Minn. 1995) (upholding
admission of evidence despite the court’s express acknowledgment that the issue
was close and other judges might have ruled the other way).
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anything. It is possible, based on cases of relatively recent vintage,
for an advocate to make a strong argument for or against the
admissibility of a broad range of bad acts evidence. Indeed, an
examination of the briefs submitted on behalf of the state and the
defense in any given case concerning bad acts evidence would likely
reveal reliance on two largely distinct bodies of law, such that the
parties are talking past one another as much as focusing on a single
disputed point.
This article takes no position regarding the merits of any
particular strand of precedent or the results in any of these cases,
112
nor regarding any rule that could be extracted from those results.
Instead, the article’s purpose is to attempt to assess the body of law
as a body of law; in other words, to consider the court’s statements
of the law, how those statements have evolved over time, the
existence of contradictions within that body of law, and the
dissonance between at least some portions of what that body of law
says and some of the results reached in the cases that comprise it.
Rather than consider the much-analyzed question of how bad acts
113
evidence ought to be used, I touch on even more examined
questions related to the function of law. More specifically, I
consider whether, in light of the lengthy history of this body of law,
the number of cases within it, and the inevitable internal tensions
that have developed, it is possible for a new opinion on the subject
to meaningfully fulfill the functions of a judicial opinion.
III. PRECEDENT AND THE FUNCTIONS OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS
This article now turns to consideration of two inextricably
related subjects, namely, the functions of a judicial opinion and the
doctrine of precedent, as well as the related matter of the attributes
of a judicial opinion that fulfills these functions. This discussion
serves as a prelude to a subsequent analysis of the systemic factors
that influenced the development of bad acts evidence law in
Minnesota to its current state.
As the preceding Part
112. Which, under a minimalist conception of the doctrine of precedent,
would be the true rule by which bad acts evidence is assessed. See infra text
accompanying note 129.
113. See, e.g., David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, “Other Crimes” Evidence in Sex
Offense Cases, 78 MINN. L. REV. 529 (1994); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Using a
Contextual Construction to Resolve the Dispute over the Meaning of the Term “Plan” in
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 1005 (1995); Thomas J. Reed,
Reading Gaol Revisited: Admission of Uncharged Misconduct Evidence in Sex Offender
Cases, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127 (1993).
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demonstrated, that state is one of doctrinal muddle, such that the
entire body of law needs thorough reconsideration. This Part also
serves as a foundation for the later argument that it would be
appropriate for this reconsideration to take place in the context of
a single opinion, rather than incrementally. I focus on three
commonly-offered justifications for the practice of issuing written
opinions: that judicial opinions are necessary to maintain the
legitimacy of the judicial branch, to provide guidance to future
actors, and to help ensure that similarly situated persons receive
114
similar treatment.
The value of opinions in furthering the legitimacy of the
judiciary stems from the fact that courts operate largely outside the
public eye. In contrast to the more political branches, the
questions considered by the judiciary are almost uniformly discrete
and of little immediate concern to anyone but the parties involved.
In light of this, written opinions serve the goal of legitimacy in two
ways. First, they make the court’s reasoning public, thereby
furthering the processes enumerated in the preceding
115
paragraph.
Second, and less obviously, they encourage the
author to reason more carefully toward a conclusion. The process
of justifying a decision may lead the judge to determine that her
116
initial conclusions need modification.
Thus opinions serve not
114. These justifications can be further refined. See HENRY M. HART, JR. &
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW 568-69 (Willam N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994)
(articulating twelve distinct reasons for adhering to prior holdings).
115. “One of the few ways we have to justify our power to decide matters
important to our fellow citizens is to explain why we decide as we do.” Patricia M.
Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1371, 1372 (1995). See also Polly J. Price, Precedent and Judicial Power After the
Founding, 42 B.C. L. REV. 81, 111 (2000) (noting “the value of transparency in
judicial decisionmaking”).
116. See, e.g., PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 31 (1976)
(“[c]onclusions easily reached without setting down the reasons sometimes
undergo revision when the decider sets out to justify the decision.”). Two
developments, both products of the explosive growth in appellate court caseloads
over the past forty years, have combined to make this feature of opinions less true
than it once was. The first is the rise of the law clerk, such that many if not most
opinions are written by law clerks and merely edited by judges. See RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 139-57 (1996) [hereinafter
POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS]. Thus, judges, and the public, have lost the benefit of
the reasoning that accompanies the writing process. Editing does not stimulate
the same critical impulses and the law clerks who draft the opinions may lack the
breadth of knowledge or the confidence to point out difficulties to their judge.
The second is the rise of the unpublished and often nonprecedential opinion,
which is typically less carefully-crafted than its published counterpart and often
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only to expose the court’s reasoning process, but to enhance it.
Even so, the issuance of a written opinion may do little to
achieve the legitimacy goal in any given case. A court wishing to
avoid a result seemingly compelled by strict adherence to the law
117
In most cases,
has many devices available to enable it to do so.
only the parties to the litigation are likely to know of the avoidance
and only the disadvantaged party is likely to care. Yet, over time,
the individual cases coalesce into a body of law. Certainly in this
broader sense, individual opinions, which are the only source of
the stated reasons for the doctrines espoused in that body of law,
are important both to facilitate the operation of the system of
118
checks and balances and, at a more remote level, to maintain
119
public confidence in the judicial system.
The advisory function of opinions is self-evident. Regardless of
whether one believes that the law is merely a prediction of what
120
judges will do, it is of great practical importance to be able to
make such a prediction. To private parties structuring their affairs
with an eye toward avoiding litigation, and to litigants and trial
court judges looking to resolve a dispute in accordance with the
law, a clearly-written appellate opinion that speaks to the question
at hand is a welcome thing. Even an opinion addressing a related
question can be useful so long as one can extract from that opinion
subject to even less scrutiny by the judge. See John P. Borger & Chad M.
Oldfather, Anastasoff v. United States and the Debate Over Unpublished Opinions, 36
TORT & INS. L.J., 899, 903 (2001).
117. See, e.g., POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 116, at 165 (“the
unpublished opinion provides a temptation for judges to shove difficult issues
under the rug in cases where a one-liner would be too blatant an evasion of
judicial duty.”); Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, 1 J. APP. PRAC.
& PROC. 219, 223 (1999) (noting that the device of unpublished opinions allow a
court to avoid strict adherence to the law by “sweeping the difficulties under the
rug”).
118. See ROSCOE POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 4 (1961) (noting
that the written opinion “serves as a check upon the judiciary under our system of
checks and balances in a polity in which so many legal questions are political and
so many political questions are legal.”).
119. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It is
confidence in the men and women who administer the judicial system that is the
true backbone of the rule of law.”); id. at 157-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting
that the public’s confidence in the courts “is a vitally necessary ingredient of any
successful effort to protect basic liberty and, indeed, the rule of law itself.”).
120. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461
(1897) (“The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more
pretentious, are what I mean by the law.”). For a general discussion of prediction
theory, see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 221-28
(1990)[hereinafter POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE].
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the principles at operation and do so in a form that makes it
apparent how and why they might apply to the new situation.
The third justification, which is closely related to the first two,
is that written opinions do a good deal to further the fairness of the
system. Fairness is one of the central tenets of our judicial system, a
121
goal often expressed in the maxim that like cases be treated alike.
Though there is plenty of room for disagreement over the level of
generality at which cases are regarded as sufficiently similar to
122
receive the same treatment, and probably even over what it
means for cases to be treated alike, there is, nonetheless, nearuniversal agreement that the manner in which the law is applied
ought not to depend on legally irrelevant particulars of the parties
before the court. The written opinion, in both the individual case
and as part of the body of law, serves as a vehicle for courts to
123
demonstrate that there is some content to this notion.
Essential to the working of all of these functions is the idea of
124
Conceptually, the notion of precedent is easy to
precedent.
understand—courts, in deciding a current case, are constrained by
their decisions in prior cases. Where a court has before answered a
question one way, it cannot—absent some very compelling
reason—later answer that question another way. A recent case
highlighting the requirements of precedent is Anastasoff v. United
125
States, in which a panel of the Eighth Circuit held itself bound to
follow the decision of an earlier panel that a statutory mailbox rule
126
did not apply to claims for federal income tax refunds.
Thus it
th
121. See, e.g., Jones v. Mabry, 723 F.2d 590, 596 (8 Cir. 1983) (“A fundamental
duty of courts of justice is to decide like cases alike. . . .”).
122. See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 595-97 (1987).
123. See Price, supra note 115, at 111; Wald, supra note 115, at 1372 (observing
that written opinions serve “to demonstrate our recognition that under a
government of laws, ordinary people have a right to expect that the law will apply
to all citizens alike.”).
124. See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 63 (1988)
(“As a symbolic matter, disregard of what precedent courts say, if widely engaged
in, would imply less than full respect for courts by courts, an attitude hardly
calculated to instill respect for courts by others.”); Price, supra note 115, at 111
(“[T]he only way a court can know that it is treating like cases alike is through the
discipline of a doctrine of precedent.”).
th
th
125. 223 F.3d 898 (8 Cir. 2000), vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8 Cir. 2000)
(en banc).
126. Id. at 905 (holding itself constrained by Christie v. United States, No. 912375 MN (8th Cir. Mar. 20, 1992)). Anastasoff was noteworthy because it held that
the “judicial power” created in Article III of the United States Constitution was
inherently limited by the doctrine of precedent, such that Eighth Circuit Rule
28A(i), which deems the court’s unpublished opinions to be nonprecedential, was
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declined to reconsider the prior decision despite an intervening
case in which the Second Circuit reached the opposite
127
conclusion. Had the court concluded otherwise, the functions of
judicial opinions would not have been served. Similarly-situated
parties would not have been treated alike, the ability to structure
one’s affairs in certain compliance with law would have been
reduced, and, in consequence, public confidence in the judiciary
and the law would have decreased. The net effect of any given
opinion on these global concerns is, of course, quite small and,
accordingly, can, in any particular case, be trumped by other
concerns, such as for adopting the better rule of law. In any event,
while the implications of the doctrine of precedent are clear in a
case like Anastasoff, in which the question decided in the first case is
identical in all material respects to the question presented in the
second, things quickly become murky as differences appear
between the authority and the case under decision.
Prevailing conceptions of the binding force of precedent have
128
varied throughout American history.
Even today there is
tremendous disagreement on this point.
Some advocate a
minimalist view of the doctrine, under which only the court’s
decision “measured by the precise adjudicative facts that give rise to
the rule of the case,” and not the reasoning behind that decision,
129
has the force of law.
This view holds that an opinion generates
law only to the extent that it assigns consequences to a specific set
of facts, with principles of law emerging only after a number of
unconstitutional. 223 F.3d at 900. See generally Borger & Oldfather, supra note
116.
127. Weisbart v. Unites States, Dep’t of Treasury, No. 99-6134, 2000 WL
1041231, at *1 (2d Cir. July 28, 2000).
128. See Price, supra note 115, at 107-15.
129. See, e.g., RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, OPINION WRITING 10 (1990) [hereinafter
ALDISERT, OPINION]. Professor Schauer has suggested that this is the only possible
meaning of precedent:
If precedent is seen as a rule directing a decisionmaker to take prior
decisions into account, then it follows that a pure argument from
precedent, unlike an argument from experience, depends only on the
results of those decisions, and not on the validity of the reasons
supporting those results. . . . If precedent matters, a prior decision now
believed erroneous still affects the current decision simply because it is
prior.
Schauer, supra note 122, at 576. His later work suggests that he might also
acknowledge that a rule of precedent could direct a decisionmaker to follow the
reasons supporting a prior decision, that is to say its mode of analysis, without
regard to the validity of those reasons. See Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62
U. CHI. L. REV. 1455, 1469-70 (1995).
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130

similar cases have been decided.
At the other end of the
spectrum are those who assign significance not only to the
reasoning exhibited in a court’s opinion, but also to the specific
131
language used to express that reasoning.
Both views are problematic. Under the minimalist view the
doctrine has little content. If all that matters are the facts and the
result reached on those facts, with everything else in an opinion
amounting only to dicta, then it is entirely too easy to distinguish
nearly every prior case. As a result, once one discards all or even
most of a court’s characterization of its decision, the notion of
132
being bound by precedent loses almost all of its meaning.
On
the other hand, a conception of precedent under which courts are
bound not only by the result and the reasoning of prior courts, but
also the language in which that reasoning is portrayed, does too
much. Courts hear individual cases, each presenting but a single
version of all the situations that could possibly arise. The danger of
placing too much emphasis on an earlier court’s characterization
of the rule it applied is that the earlier court cannot be expected to
have thought through all of the possible variations that might arise,
and so could inadvertently bind a later court to a result that not
133
even the first court would have reached.
Though a definitive
formulation of the law may be appropriate in the later stages of a
doctrine’s development, where a court will have developed enough
experience to have a feel for the difficult areas and a perspective
on how best to address them, too much emphasis on early opinions
could easily result in the later court having to reach results the
initial court would not have reached had the situation been
presented.
What happens in practice is not a consistent application of any
view of the scope of the doctrine of precedent. Lawyers and judges
130. See ALDISERT, OPINION, supra note 129, at 29-30. See also Danny J. Boggs &
Brian P. Brooks, Unpublished Opinions and the Nature of Precedent, 4 GREEN BAG 2D
17, 24 (2000).
131. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski & Stephen Reinhardt, Please Don’t Cite This! Why We
Don’t Allow Citation to Unpublished Dispositions, CAL. LAWYER, June 2000, at 44
(expressing the view that for an opinion to constitute precedent, the judges on the
panel must “subscribe not merely to the result but also to the phrasing of the
disposition.”).
132. See EISENBERG, supra note 124, at 53.
133. See Schauer, supra note 122, at 579-80 (noting that a decision
“accompanied by an articulated and authoritative characterization of the decision
and its underlying facts” creates a hurdle to a subsequent decisionmaker inclined
to decide a case differently).
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move from one approach to the next as it suits their purpose,
minimizing the value of unfavorable cases while lauding every
aspect of opinions that support the position they advocate or the
134
holding they intend to reach. Strict application of the minimalist
135
Moreover, neither the bench nor the bar regards
view is rare.
each decision from a given court as of equal precedential value
with every other opinion of that court. Instead, an opinion’s
persuasive value varies with a number of factors, including the
identity of its author, whether the court was unanimous and, if not,
what was said in dissent, and the intrinsic quality of the opinion,
which itself is assessed by such criteria as the authority relied on
and the extent to which it gives the appearance that the court
136
thoroughly considered the issue at hand.
Even professed
minimalists acknowledge “[t]he brute fact . . . that not all
137
precedent represents currency of equal value.”
There are problems associated with a system based on
precedent aside from its malleability. A by-product, if not a
justification, for the use of precedent is that it creates an economy
138
in the judicial task.
Judges need not reinvent the wheel by
reasoning from first principles in every case. The big questions will
almost always have been answered before, allowing the judge to
focus her attention on the narrow problems presented in a given
case. Most of the time this works exactly as intended—but not
always. By encouraging unquestioned reliance on what courts have
done in the past—even if courts appear to have done the same
thing many times—precedent can lead to a failure to consider what
ought to be disputable points. It is not so much that many new
cases call for the reconsideration of the larger issues, but that a
failure to give due consideration to the larger issues can lead to an
incomplete analysis of the smaller problem at hand. As the
separation between the particulars of the precedent and the case at
hand increases, so does the danger that a court simply concluding
itself to be bound by precedent is substituting a label in place of
thoughtful consideration of whether the differences between cases
are meaningful in light of the reasons and policies behind the legal
134. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 66-69 (1951); Wald, supra note
115, at 1399-1403.
135. EISENBERG, supra note 124, at 53.
136. See, e.g., Walter V. Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 3
(1966).
137. ALDISERT, OPINION, supra note 129, at 112.
138. Schauer, supra note 122, at 599.
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rule to be applied. As Judge Posner has put it, the writer becomes
so caught up in the task of marshaling authority for the conclusion
he wishes to reach that he fails to give full consideration to the
139
meaning of the legal principles at issue.
The result can be an
opinion replete with citations to authority, all of which “disguise
the fact that no reasons have in reality been given for a particular
140
judgment.”
A variant on this problem arises in the context of dicta. It is
easy for a lawyer or a judge to dismiss language from a prior
opinion as dicta, further consideration of which is thereby
rendered unnecessary. But this practice, too, tends to eviscerate
the concept of precedent, because it is merely the other side of the
minimalist view, under which nearly every case can be distinguished
from those that have come before. Moreover, to dismiss something
as dicta is to sweep it away by labeling it rather than by confronting
it. Language does not make it into an opinion by accident. At least
one judge, and possibly a panel of judges, thought about that
language, intentionally placed it in the opinion and meant for it to
have some effect in the context of a particular sort of case. It is
legitimate for a later court to conclude that portions of a prior
opinion are inapplicable because the earlier court clearly did not
have a certain wrinkle in mind. It is not legitimate simply to say
that the language is dicta and refuse to consider it with no further
justification. The difference between these two approaches is
rarely more than a couple of sentences in an opinion. Those
sentences, however, are critical to that opinion’s legitimacy.
A final danger that accompanies reliance on precedent is that
there can be too much of it. Once a body of law grows to a certain
size it becomes inconvenient to cite to, let alone consider, all of the
141
cases that ought properly to be viewed as precedent.
At some
point the system of precedent breaks down simply because it is not
139. See Richard A. Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles and Do They Matter?, 62 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1421, 1441-42, 1447(1995). The effect is similar to that arising from an
unthinking dependence on metaphor. See Chad M. Oldfather, The Hidden Ball: A
Substantive Critique of Baseball Metaphors in Judicial Opinions, 27 CONN. L. REV. 17, 2930 (1994).
140. RUPERT CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW 196 (2d ed. 1968).
141. See, e.g., John J. O’Connell, A Dissertation on Judicial Opinions, 23 TEMP.
L.Q. 13, 14 (1949) (tracing the perceived problem of too much law to as far back
as 1831 and noting the consistent requests by members of the bar for limitations
on publication). This concern initially motivated requests for courts not to issue
published opinions in all of their cases, most of which originated with members of
the bar who were having difficulty keeping abreast of the law.
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realistically possible for courts or litigants to factor all relevant prior
decisions into the analysis of any current case. When that point is
reached, the inevitable result is that, whether viewed in terms of
142
their results or their rationale, cases are not consistently decided.
None of this is meant to suggest anything but that the doctrine
of precedent has its shortcomings and that for judicial opinions to
serve their purposes—in both the individual case and as constituent
parts of a body of law—these limitations must be taken into
account. As noted above, a meaningful doctrine of precedent is
essential for judicial opinions to serve the functions for which they
were designed. Yet the doctrine of precedent itself depends on the
143
issuance of written opinions.
If the courts that issue those
opinions succumb to the dangers just outlined, however, the
concept of precedent becomes meaningless. The way out of these
difficulties is to take a flexible approach to precedent, where the
focus is not so much on how broad the binding portion of a prior
opinion ought to be, but rather on the extent to which any portion
of it is binding. Under this view precedent constitutes a starting
point, “a presumptive but not an absolute constraint on what courts
144
may do.” Ideally,
a determination of what rule a precedent stands for
typically involves consideration not only of the intent of
the precedent court, as revealed by its language taken in
context, but also professional discourse concerning the
precedent, changes in social propositions and in doctrine
after the precedent was decided, and the judgment of the
deciding court concerning what rule would be most
socially congruent and systematically consistent.
Accordingly, the role of a deciding court in determining
what rule a precedent stands for is not so much to
determine what the precedent was intended to stand for
145
as to determine what it has or will come to stand for.
This, of course, entails a good deal of mindfulness on the part
142. CROSS, supra note 140, at 196 (“The result of [the] failure to cite [all
relevant cases] is a goodly number, if not a plethora, of cases in conflict or near
conflict with each other.”).
143. James Boyd White, What’s an Opinion For?, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1363, 1366
(1995)(“[T]he invocation of the past as authority . . . seems to require the
existence of the judicial opinion, or something like it.”).
144. Price, supra note 115, at 86 (characterizing this concept of precedent as
that embodied in Article III of the United States Constitution).
145. EISENBERG, supra note 124, at 52. Interestingly, Professor Eisenberg
characterizes this as a description of how precedent operates in actual practice. Id.
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of courts, not only in the way they go about deciding cases, but
more importantly (for purposes of this article), in the way they
justify their decisions. Though some contend that there is little
146
relation between the style and the quality of a judicial opinion,
certain approaches to the task do appear to lend themselves more
readily to opinions that convey an awareness of these limitations.
Judge Posner, for example, prefers what he terms the “impure”
147
style. The author of such an opinion forswears the impersonality
and formality of the traditional judicial opinion, instead writing as
if he were “explaining to a hypothetical audience of laypersons why
148
the case is being decided in the way that it is.”
Rather than
engaging in the formalist fiction that the “right” answers to the
questions presented in a case can always “be resolved by the
149
straightforward application of settled principles,” or that opinions
150
ought to at least look as though that is all the court is doing, the
pragmatist judge attempts only to reach “the most reasonable result
in the circumstances, with due regard for such systematic
constraints on the freewheeling employment of ‘reason’ as the
need to maintain continuity with previous decisions and respect the
limitations that the language and discernible purposes of
151
constitutional and statutory texts impose on the interpreter.”
As Professor Giradeau Spann has put it, this sort of opinion
acknowledges that “[l]egal doctrines do not simply exist; they exist
152
for a purpose.”
What he terms a “functional analysis” makes it
easier to assess the persuasiveness of a given opinion, in turn
facilitating a healthy debate over the merits of both the result and
146. Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1455, 1466
(1995).
Insofar as there is a standard of good judicial reasoning, and insofar as it
is undesirable to hide bad judicial reasoning, it is far from clear that the
characteristics of judicial opinions nowadays castigated are any more
likely to facilitate such deception than are the characteristics celebrated
by the contemporary critics.
Id.
147. See Posner, supra note 139, at 1429-30.
148. Id. at 1430.
149. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 147
(1996).
150. See Schaefer, supra note 136. “Although an opinion may be born only
after deep travail and may be the result of a very modest degree of conviction, it is
usually written in terms of ultimate certainty.” Id. at 9.
151. Posner, supra note 139, at 1432-33.
152. Girardeau A. Spann, Functional Analysis of the Plain Error Rule, 71 GEO. L. J.
945, 979 (1983).
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the form and content of the analysis leading to that result.
Opinions that justify their results through little more than
references to ostensibly controlling precedent, in contrast, stifle
debate by creating an unjustified aura of inevitability to decisions
154
that, in reality, were the product of considerable discretion. Even
worse, where an opinion fails to describe why the policies behind
the rules compel their application in that case, the judicial act
appears to be based on instinct as much as on reason. Though
instinct is undoubtedly an element of many, if not most, judicial
155
decisions, reason is supposed to be at the core of the system.
Opinions ought to demonstrate that the process was undertaken in
a manner consistent with that core value.
IV. ASSESSING THE LAW OF BAD ACTS EVIDENCE
As discussed in Part II, the law relating to bad acts evidence in
Minnesota suffers from a number of the problems of a large body
of law. The Minnesota Supreme Court has never disavowed any of
its case law. Yet an examination of that law reveals two distinct and
fundamentally conflicting lines of precedent dating back to the
beginning of the century. Only rarely has the court acknowledged
this conflict and its embrace of either line has always been
incomplete at best. Furthermore, over time, the law has naturally
drifted away from its starting place, taken on new emphases, and
156
acquired new elements.
As this law has developed and become
153. See id. at 979-82.
154. Id.
155. See generally RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: READINGS,
MATERIALS, AND CASES 374-88 (1976) [hereinafter ALDISERT, JUDICIAL PROCESS].
156. The primary explanation for this doctrinal drift is simply that it is an
inherent by-product of lawmaking via the common law method. See POSNER,
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 120. “[A] series of small steps can add up to a giant
stride, and although on the one hand moving incrementally gives judges a chance
to stop as soon as experience demonstrates the error of their ways, on the other
hand it may conceal from them the magnitude of the change they are
cumulatively effecting.” Id. at 292. See also OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE
COMMON LAW 5 (Mark Dewolfe Howe ed., 1963). This effect can be magnified in
the criminal context, where the equities of the situation generally make it not only
easier, but more palatable in a “rough justice” sense, to affirm a conviction,
thereby leading to an increasingly permissive approach to the admission of bad
acts evidence. In addition, even if this permissiveness is not completely reflected
in the language of opinions, the results of the cases may nonetheless signal a more
permissive approach, just as most motorists’ experience is that the official, posted
speed limit is not the effective speed limit.
There may also be other factors at work that are more specific to
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more doctrinally complex, additional internal inconsistencies have
arisen as artifacts from the older case law are carried over into the
157
Moreover, as is inevitable in any body of law so
newer cases.
large, even apart from doctrinal conflicts, the results reached in the
158
cases cannot all be squared with one another.
This part measures the law of bad acts evidence in Minnesota
against the criteria considered in Part III. In particular, it focuses
on the likelihood that a judicial opinion crafted in the traditional
style and utilizing the tools provided can meaningfully fulfill the
functions that opinions are designed to serve. It concludes that,
given the inherent demands of the doctrine of precedent and the
dangers that stem from that doctrine, it is nearly impossible for an
opinion to resolve a single dispute by reference merely to existing
Minnesota bad acts caselaw. It next proposes that the Minnesota
Supreme Court can consistently achieve the appropriate systemic
goals only following a large-scale reconsideration of the
Minnesota. The Minnesota Supreme Court, for example, assigns opinions before
cases are decided. In the view of one jurist, this practice “has the unfortunate
tendency to encourage individual judges in a multi-judge court to concentrate
only on the cases assigned to them and, conversely, to give too much deference,
consciously or unconsciously, to the judge who has been assigned the opinion.
This is a fertile field for a one-person opinion to emerge from a multi-judge
court.” ALDISERT, OPINION, supra note 129, at 34. My review of the court’s cases in
the course of researching this article suggests, on at least an impressionistic level,
that individual members of the court often have a preferred way of stating the
applicable standards, which are often inconsistent, in emphasis or otherwise, with
other justices’ formulations. This, in turn, is at least in part the result of the need
for collegiality, which prevents members of the court from an overly detailed
critique of other members’ opinions. See also Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives
on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 350-51 (1974) (discussing the
institutional constraints under which the Supreme Court operates); Schaefer,
supra note 136, at 9-10.
A final consideration is that many, if not most, of the court’s opinions on
the subject are issued in first-degree murder cases. See, e.g., State v. Shannon, 583
N.W.2d 579 (Minn. 1998); State v. Dewald, 464 N.W.2d 500 (Minn. 1991); State v.
Eling, 355 N.W.2d 286 (Minn. 1984). The court must accept review of these cases.
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 29.02, subd. 1. As a result, it is likely that they do not present
the issues as well as other cases might. Since the court issues frequent opinions on
the subject, however, it is probably less likely to accept discretionary review of
those cases that present the issues well. Beyond that, because there is such an
extensive body of law and apparent precedent speaking to nearly every question
that might arise, it will be a rare case that invites fundamental reconsideration of
the doctrine.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 109-11.
158. See CROSS, supra note 140, at 96 (noting the tendency toward conflicting
decisions). This effect would undoubtedly be magnified were one to include
opinions of the Minnesota Court of Appeals in the analysis.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol28/iss1/15

38

05_FINAL.OLDFATHER 08.23.01.DOC

2001]

Oldfather: Other Bad Acts and the Failure of Precedent
OTHER BAD ACTS EVIDENCE

9/7/2001 11:14 AM

189

admissibility of bad acts evidence.
Though any such
reconsideration would necessarily be constrained by the provisions
of Rule 404(b), there nonetheless remains considerable room for
the court to reconceptualize and streamline its approach and,
more importantly, to articulate the objectives the law is intended to
achieve.
1. Bad Acts Law and the Function of Opinions
Given the present characteristics of the body of bad acts
evidence law in Minnesota, it is difficult for a traditional judicial
opinion working with that law to fulfill the functions that opinions
are designed to serve. This is not to imply any sort of improper
motivation on the part of judges. It is simply that the traditional
model of a judicial opinion calls for the analysis to be guided by
precedent and for an explication of that analysis to be supported by
a recitation of that authority, ideally in such a manner as to give the
159
conclusion an aura of inevitability.
Where there are doctrinal
tensions and conflicting precedents, however, the traditional
model requires judges to choose between precedents and to elevate
some aspects of doctrine over others and it encourages them to do
so without acknowledgement. The processes of deciding and
justifying a decision, though related, are distinct and many jurists
candidly admit that there is often a disconnect between the factors
160
utilized in the former process and those articulated in the latter.
But even where the judge intends complete identity between what
was considered and what is stated, where precedent is unsettled, an
opinion that purports to resolve a case largely by reference to
precedent will fail to serve its intended purposes. The law of bad
acts evidence as it presently stands in Minnesota is especially
susceptible to such failures.
The fundamental problem is that there is too much law, both
in terms of the number of opinions already part of the body of law
and the amount and degree of variation in the characterizations of
the rules within that body of law. As Part II demonstrated, there
are individual cases that are difficult to square with one another
and, more significantly, there are aspects of the stated rules that are

159. See Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles, supra note 139, at 1439-42 (critiquing an
opinion written pursuant to the traditional model).
160. See ALDISERT, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 155, at 464; KARL N.
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 56 (1960).
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difficult to square with one another. The situation is such that, in
nearly any case involving bad acts evidence, both the defense and
the prosecution can craft what in a vacuum appear to be strong
arguments for their respective positions and do so using cases that
are in all respects “good law.” In part, this is an inherent feature of
the law’s subject matter. There are few easy cases. Because bad
acts evidence is nearly always relevant and nearly always prejudicial,
many cases will appear to fall close to the line. Rather than
excusing doctrinal opacity, however, this underscores the need for
a clear expression of the factors to be considered.
For the most part, however, these problems stem from the
court’s failure to ever completely cast its lot with either Fichette or
Ames. Because there are coexisting lines of precedent supporting
fundamentally opposed approaches, any opinion that justifies its
conclusion through the traditional means of marshaling authority
in support of a result will necessarily fail to fulfill the functions of
judicial opinions. Any result entails disregarding precedent,
whether through distinguishing it or simply choosing not to
mention it. This phenomenon was especially apparent in the early
part of the century as Fitchette and Ames themselves cycled in and
out of favor. Though less evident in today’s more nuanced body of
law, shades of it inhere in the uncertainty regarding the standards
applicable to identity evidence.
In similar fashion, because there are internal tensions in the
common articulations of the applicable rules, any result requires a
court to elevate certain aspects of the rule over others. The best
example of this comes in the conflict between the notion that
defendants are to be given the benefit of the doubt when it comes
to admissibility and the notions that trial courts have broad
discretion on the same point and the defendant bears the burden
161
of demonstrating that that discretion was abused.
Because
precedent—whether viewed as the results of previous cases, as the
rules announced in previous cases, or something in between—is
critical to the proper functioning of judicial opinions, and because
precedent cannot be fully honored in these circumstances, the
traditional opinion cannot do its job. There is not merely a
danger, but a near certainty that like cases will not be treated alike.
Each new case exacerbates this problem by adding another opinion
to the conflicting lines of precedent, thereby decreasing the extent
161.

See supra text accompanying note 109-111.
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to which judges and lawyers can predict the result in the next case.
2. The Need for a Dramatic Remedy
Holmes described the development of the law as follows:
The customs, beliefs, or needs of a primitive time establish
a rule or a formula. In the course of centuries the
custom, belief, or necessity disappears but the rule
remains. The reason which gave rise to the rule has been
forgotten, and ingenious minds set themselves to inquire
how it is to be accounted for. Some ground of policy is
thought of, which seems to explain it and to reconcile it
with the present state of things; and then the rule adapts
itself to the new reasons which have been found for it, and
enters on a new career. The old form receives new
content, and in time even the form modifies itself to fit
162
the meaning which it has received.
In the case of bad acts evidence, it is not so much that the
reasons underlying the rules have changed. To be sure, social
science research may have advanced our understanding of the
validity of the assumptions behind the general prohibition against
the admission of bad acts evidence, which relate not only to
criminal behavior but also to jurors’ behavior, to the point where
163
the rules ought to account for these advances.
But the bigger
problem is that the court has never ultimately determined the
proper content of the applicable rules. This makes “adjusting”
them a difficult proposition.
Holmes’ conception of the law suggests that the doctrinal
kinks will work themselves out over time. Under this view, the cases
will eventually trend in one direction, with continual
reexamination of the rules in the unending series of cases leading
ultimately to doctrinal equilibrium. History suggests, however, that
an incremental approach to change will not succeed in the context
of bad acts evidence. The law has remained unsettled for at least a
century. During that time, the court, or at least individual justices
writing on behalf of the court, has attempted to clarify the law on a

162. HOLMES, supra note 156, at 8.
163. E.g., Rochelle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting
Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 9 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 37 (1985) (examining the relationship between introduction of bad acts
evidence, rates of conviction, and credibility of witnesses).
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number of occasions. Each of these attempts has largely been
ignored or at least not treated as a watershed. Even those opinions
that resulted in legitimate reform—especially Billstrom and Spreigl—
have seen much of the clarity they brought to the law drifted over
by the blizzard of subsequent opinions. Moreover, in simply
creating overlays to the existing doctrine, rather than reconsidering
the issue from the ground up, Spreigl and Billstrom may well have
engendered as many doctrinal difficulties as they solved.
Though these phenomena are likely to be present to some
degree in any body of law in which the issues are frequently
litigated, the nature of bad acts evidence may make it especially
fertile ground for the cultivation of unsettled doctrine. It is easy in
the abstract to understand both why bad acts evidence is relevant
and why it is extremely prejudicial. It is not always easy in the
context of an individual case to resolve these conflicting concerns.
But in at least some portion of the cases, either relevance or
prejudice clearly dominates the equation. In justifying these
cases—particularly those where prejudice clearly outweighs
relevance—it may be tempting to make statements of principle that
become inconvenient when the opposite dynamic appears. The
result is not an elegant jurisprudence. Because the cases continue
to require choices between two divergent objectives, the likelihood
of incremental adjudication leading to a consistent body of law is
small.
Moreover, because the existing body of law is so vast, the
likelihood that any new case will present what appears to be a novel
situation, let alone raise questions that invite doctrinal
reconsideration at a fundamental level, is slight. Even if the court
were to attempt to effect a thorough reconsideration of its
jurisprudence incrementally, the present anonymity of many of its
past opinions that read as though they were meant to put the law
on a different course suggests that an incremental approach is
likely to fail.
In addition, any true reconsideration would
necessarily signal much of what a comprehensive rethinking would
entail. The only workable way out of the current confusion and
inconsistency is for the court to engage in a deliberate, top-tobottom reconsideration of the law relating to bad acts evidence,
164
constrained only by the terms of Rule 404(b).
164. This is nowhere near as significant a constraint as might first appear. The
rule speaks in broad terms, and is thereby subject to a broad range of reasonable
interpretations. Indeed, the federal courts have interpreted the nearly-identical
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The focus of the inquiry should be to generate a definitive
statement of the instrumental goals that are to guide application of
the rule, with formulation of more specific rules by which those
goals are to be implemented as only a secondary concern.
Something approaching a complex set of rules has been, and may
continue to be, appropriate in the context of other crimes
165
evidence.
But absent a structure that requires, or at least
encourages, resort to guiding principles in the application of the
rules, a complex structure may simply encourage or enable a paintby-numbers approach that results in the same systemic problems
166
Especially in light of the
that characterize bad acts law today.
inevitable pull toward affirmance that arises from the facts of nearly
all bad acts cases, precommitment to a rule and a manner of
application based on a largely dispassionate consideration of the
policies at play can only enhance the integrity of the law going
forward by ensuring that courts give due consideration to these
policies in subsequent cases.
Beyond the mere practical need for clarity of approach, such
an opinion would be consistent with—or at least not inconsistent
with—the court’s role and nowhere near as radical a step as it
might first appear. Courts’ responsibility for making law, though
167
tied to the resolution of concrete disputes, is not limited by it.
Consistent with this, the Minnesota Supreme Court has regularly
exercised its supervisory powers to create prospective requirements
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) in a manner considerably different from the Minnesota
court’s interpretation of Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). E.g., United States v. LeCompte,
99 F.3d 274, 277-79 (8th Cir. 1996) (evincing more rigid interpretations of the
scope of the exceptions); United States v. Gessa, 971 F.2d 1257, 1261-62 (6th Cir.
1992) (en banc) (holding that the determination of whether proposed bad acts
evidence falls within the scope of an exception is a legal determination).
165. See Schauer, supra note 129, at 1470 (arguing that lengthy and complex
opinions may be necessary given the present judicial structure, and that “it may be
appropriate to think of opinion writing as (at least in part) a conscious process of
rule making.”).
166. Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles, supra note 139, at 1439-41 (disparaging multifactor tests as enabling a court to clothe a decision in an often unwarranted cloak
of certainty).
167. See EISENBERG, supra note 124, at 4-5 (“Our society has an enormous
demand for legal rules that private actors can live, plan, and settle by. The
legislature cannot adequately satisfy this demand. . . . Accordingly, it is socially
desirable that the courts should act to enrich the supply of legal rules . . . by
attaching much greater emphasis to the establishment of legal rules than would be
necessary if courts’ sole function were the resolution of disputes.”). But see
ALDISERT, OPINION, supra note 129, at 9 (“Announcing a rule of law of the case is
nothing but a byproduct of the court’s adjudicative function.”).
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and otherwise address issues outside the narrow scope of the
168
dispute before it. Because this is a mature body of law, at least in
the sense that the courts have a broad range of experience with the
possible factual scenarios that may arise, the court need not be
concerned that it would formulate a rule that history would reveal
169
to be ill-advised. In similar fashion, there exists a broad range of
materials beyond its own past cases for the court to draw on in its
170
Many of the arguments against a global
consideration.
168. See State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1984) aff’d 620 N.W.2d 706
(Minn. 2001) (establishing, pursuant to its “supervisory power to ensure the fair
administration of justice,” a requirement that all custodial interrogations be
electronically recorded). See also WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §
1.5(i) (3d ed. 2000) (discussing rulings related to the supervisory authority of
courts); Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial
Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1887 (2001) (considering generally the
applicability of justiciability principles to state courts and noting specifically that
“the standard critique of judicial activism . . . does not apply to state courts.”).
169. The court could further reduce the likelihood of this happening by
emphasizing that the focus of courts’ consideration is to be on the rules
articulated in the case as illuminated by the overarching policy concerns
motivating those rules and by expressly providing that, in precedential terms, the
opinion is intended to constitute a firm, but not wholly inflexible, starting point
for analysis.
170. Though I cannot claim to have the sort of “ingenious mind” necessary
under Holmes’ description to account for what the rule ought to be, I nonetheless
offer the following non-exhaustive list of points that ought to be taken into
account in any global reconsideration. (1) It is widely acknowledged to be fiction
to suppose that juries will use bad acts evidence, once admitted, for only the
limited purpose for which it is offered. That this is so creates the potential for
broad disparities of result between similarly situated defendants, based entirely on
the trial judge’s decision whether to admit bad acts evidence. (2) How should
juries be instructed regarding the use of bad acts evidence? Despite the significant
similarities between Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) and Minn. R. Evid. 404(b), the required
instructions under the two rules are widely divergent. Compare 10 STEPHEN E.
FORESTELL, MINNESOTA PRACTICE 30 (1999) (Minnesota pattern jury instruction)
with JUDICIAL COMMITTEE ON MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT,
JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 33-37 (2000) (Eighth Circuit pattern
jury instruction). (3) Preventing the conviction of innocent defendants is
generally acknowledged to be one of the central goals of our criminal justice
system. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.4(e) (3d ed. 2000).
Yet current law provides for no meaningful appellate review of the sufficiency of
evidence supporting criminal convictions. See Jon O. Newman, Beyond Reasonable
Doubt, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 993-97 (1993). At least one judge has linked this
conundrum to the use of bad acts evidence, suggesting that a rule of greater
admissibility would be appropriate so long as it was coupled with more searching
sufficiency review. See id. (4) As a general matter, the stated law relating to bad
acts evidence in Minnesota is strikingly different from the standards set forth in at
least one treatise on the law of evidence. See generally 1 JOHN W. STRONG ET AL.,
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 190 (1999). Though Minnesota may not be alone in
that respect, see David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park, “Other Crimes” Evidence in Sex
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reconsideration of the rule, such as that to do so would upset
settled expectations, are simply not present here. Such an opinion,
then, would be nothing more than a grander version of the sort of
171
“brush-clearing” opinion issued by courts all the time.
Finally, it is not insignificant that bad acts evidence is used
almost exclusively in the criminal context. Fairness, or at least the
appearance of fairness, is one of the criminal justice system’s
172
A system that places great discretion in trial
cornerstone values.
court judges without providing clear or consistent guidance
concerning how that discretion is to be exercised virtually ensures
that similarly situated persons will be subject to disparate
treatment.
V. CONCLUSION
The Minnesota Supreme Court opened the twentieth century
with a pair of cases articulating diametrically opposed approaches

Offense Cases, 78 MINN. L. REV. 529, 540-56 (1994) (discussing courts’ application of
various 404(b) exceptions), and though there are certainly strong arguments to be
made in favor of jettisoning any special standard relating to such evidence, see id.
at 560-65, this disconnect ought not to go unremarked upon. (5) The present law
places significant emphasis on the discretion of the trial court. Great appellate
deference to this discretion seems highly inconsistent with the notion that the
defendant is to be given the benefit of the doubt if the question of admissibility is
close; there appears no way around the conclusion that it is the trial judge’s
decision to admit that will be given the benefit of the doubt. (6) Discretion is not
a concept that provides its own content. To say that a decision is committed to the
discretion of the trial court means different things in different situations. See
Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 754-55 (1982).
Any reformulation ought to strive to articulate the contours of this discretion,
including in particular whether it extends only to the decision to admit evidence
found to fall within one of the 404(b) exceptions or also to the question of
whether the evidence falls within an exception. See generally United States v. Gessa,
971 F.2d 1257 (6th Cir. 1992)(en banc) (holding that the determination of
whether proposed bad acts evidence falls within the scope of an exception is a
legal determination). (7) At least some of the rationale underlying the Fitchette
form of the rule of general exclusion had to do with the unfairness inherent in
making a defendant defend himself against other crimes with little or no notice.
At least some of this unfairness was alleviated by the notice requirements of Spreigl
and Billstrom. To the extent that this unfairness was a significant reason for the
general exclusion, a more relaxed approach is more appropriate.
171. See Wald, supra note 115, at 1405 (discussing the rhetoric of opinions
dispelling with conflicting and confusing precedent).
172. See Charles Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The Value of
Complexity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1187, 1195-96 (1979) (suggesting that the appearance,
rather than the practice, of fairness may be the primary aim of the criminal justice
system).
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to the admissibility of bad acts evidence. Since then, the court has
drifted between these extremes, never fully adopting one approach
or the other and never repudiating any of its case law. This
dynamic, coupled with the addition of requirements that have
made the doctrine more complex, has produced a body of law
replete with the inconsistencies both among and within the cases
that constitute it. This, in turn, renders the notion of precedent
meaningless, such that an opinion written in the traditional fashion
can no longer speak with authority. Further, because the court’s
past attempts of incremental clarification have either failed or
worsened the problems, the only way for the court to relegitimize
this body of law is for it to fully reconsider the entire problem in
the context of a single opinion.
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